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Abstract - Undesirable changes in supply chain physical 
operations derived from disruptions in the transmission or 
storage of digital information are reported daily despite the 
Information Technology (IT) protection available. Once a 
disruption materializes, the company losses will depend on 
the coherence and swiftness of the supply chain response 
(resilience). However, current resilience frameworks are 
qualitative, do not address evolution over time as a relevant 
aspect, and thus do not provide indications on how to design 
a resilient response. This paper contributes to closing this 
gap by developing a system dynamics model from an actual 
case of resilient response after a cyber-attack. Both case-
specific and generic structures are extracted from the case 
data analysis, and a reaction mechanism is proposed that 
results in the observed behavior. The identification of these 
structures should eventually aid decision makers in the 
process of designing a resilient supply chain response.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been an undisputed increase in the use of 
Information Technology (IT) in supply chains [1]. This 
trend is likely to continue as IT enables supply chains to 
respond to market pressures for efficient operation and 
customer collaboration during product and service 
delivery. However, the complex digital network that has 
resulted has created new sources of risk, mainly related to 
unintended system flaws that make user error more likely, 
and results in both internal and external risks [2]. Internal 
risks are derived from vulnerabilities in the connections 
between system components that result in risk of failure 
even if all parts of the supply chain work as expected, and 
external risks are derived from unauthorized agents 
exploiting these vulnerabilities for their own benefit. 
Intellectual property (IP) is an example of a particular 
organizational asset which has increased its exposure to 
theft through the use of IT for its transfer, storage, and 
development coordination. IP is a central driver for 
innovation, business growth and competitiveness, 
potentially constituting as much as 80 percent of a single 
company’s value [3]. Additionally, the Sarbanes Oxley 
regulation, enforced after the Enron and Worldcom 
scandals, has imposed accounting rules that result in a 
greater required detail in the reporting of IP valuation. 
This has transformed IP from being an internal strategic 
factor, to being a public financial dimension [4]. 
Literature informs that the most advanced economies are 
those with the greatest cyber-related IP losses, theft that 
accounted for as much of the US$ 200 billion cybercrime 
losses during 2013 [5]. 
Traditionally, IP took the form of people inside the 
organization, with direct knowledge and access to R&D 
resources, who misappropriated prototypes or 
documentation, physical or digital. This restricted the 
potential suspects in cases of IP theft, and it was usually 
an action targeted to specific documents or technology. 
The digitalization of IP information transfer and storage 
has opened the field to IP thieves in any location, 
allowing for either targeted or opportunistic attacks [6], 
and allowing attackers to operate in relative anonymity. 
The pool of suspects is thus far greater, and can include 
competitors, hackers that do this for money or fun, or 
even nation-states.  
Resilience frameworks have addressed the way a 
supply chain responds over time to disruption events. 
Sheffi and Rice [7] described the extent of the 
consequences derived from a supply chain disruption as 
derived from the depth and duration of a negative 
evolution of performance resulting from the disruption, in 
what they named the “disruption curve”. This curve 
implied that an improved response to disruption would 
consist of both a shorter and a shallower disruption in 
performance. 
Despite being only qualitative, this approach contrasts 
to other supply chain resilience frameworks that identify 
resources and strategies, but do not address the 
measurement of the evolution of performance [8][9][10]. 
These resilience frameworks appear to be ill-suited 
for the challenges presented by cyber-risks in complex 
supply networks: by focusing on the expected resulting 
states and pre-existing resources required for a resilient 
response, the capabilities required to activate, drive and 
control the response have been comparatively overlooked. 
Additionally, the case study method, despite being a 
very valuable tool for inductively extracting non-
structured data about the response to disruptions, lacks a 
focus on the evolution of this response over time. 
Literature has therefore mentioned the potential for 
complementarity of the case study method with other 
methods, such as system dynamics [11]. 
Derived from these gaps, this paper contributes by 
analyzing a specific case of IP theft resulting from a 
cyber-attack and looking into some of the concrete 
organizational structures that drive the resilient response 
of the organization to this theft. This process results in a 
dynamic model, and a categorization and sensibility 
analysis of this structure on the resulting performance 
A system dynamics case study of resilient response to IP theft from a cyber-
attack 
 
D.A.Sepulveda1, O.Q. Khan2 
1Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark 
2Department of Business and Management, Aalborg University Copenhagen, Denmark 
(dasep@dtu.dk) 
 
 
evolution over time. Second, in the process of building 
this dynamic model starting from the case study 
description of the IP theft, this paper aims to outline a 
structured method for “translating” case studies into 
dynamic response structures that can be quantified and 
modeled. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: section II 
will describe the methodology; section III will describe 
the results; section IV will discuss and highlight 
implications of the results, and describe the limitations of 
the method, and section V will outline the conclusions 
and areas of future work. 
 
 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
 
 This paper uses the system dynamics (SD) framework 
to develop a dynamic model representation of a case 
study. This complementarity is particularly well suited for 
cases where there is little or no historic information, and 
where the evolution of performance is a relevant subject 
of study. 
SD is a framework for the representation of systems 
that change over time by using a network of variables in 
relationships of circular causality; network composed of 
fundamentally two types of variables, stocks 
(accumulations) and flows either flowing into or out of 
these accumulations. By virtue of different timescales or 
the specific problem under question, it is sometimes 
convenient to represent some of these stocks or flows 
either as constants, or auxiliary variables (instantaneously 
changing).  
The visible state for such a system is therefore 
completely represented by the values of the stocks in the 
system and all changes in these stocks is what can be 
understood as the system’s “behavior”. These conditions 
have two very relevant consequences: 1) By virtue of this 
networked representation, all the behaviors of a system 
are the direct result of its own structure, in what is termed 
the “endogenous” view of behavior in SD and 2) any 
system that changes over time in any interesting way, has 
at least one feedback loop (the basic circular causality 
unit) in its structure. 
Despite being Forrester [12] who started what can be 
called the “MIT school” of thought in SD modeling, this 
paper will use the method outlined by [13], and proposes 
the following steps: problem articulation, formulation of a 
dynamic hypothesis, formulation of a dynamic model, 
testing, and policy design and evaluation. 
The problem description and boundaries are obtained 
from documentation and interviews about the specific 
case study, and the data that can be extracted from these 
documents is “translated” into a causal loop diagram and 
a system dynamics model that is eventually simulated. 
 
III.  RESULTS 
 
A.  Case description 
 
ABC Industries is a producer of hardware with 
60.000 employees and a 12.2 percent operating margin. 
Six months before a product launch a federal agency 
informed ABC of a cyber-breach. The effect of this 
breach was the loss of IP data for 15 out of the 30 product 
lines. These lines were expected to contribute 25 percent 
of the company’s total revenue for the next 5 years. 
The stolen information allowed a hacker to exploit 
previously undiscovered design flaws, implant malicious 
code into these product lines, allow competitors to market 
a similar product earlier undercutting ABC on price. 
ABC’s reaction had three phases: Incident triage, 
Impact management and business recovery. 
During the incident triage phase ABC brought in the 
necessary resources to assess the initial damage and 
prepare the organization for potential consequences of 
this attack. First, a team of managers and research 
scientists was formed to oversee the efforts to minimize 
the effects of this attack. This had negative effect on 
productivity. Second, an external cyber-security company 
was hired to investigate the leak, and patch the system to 
future similar attacks. Third, a law firm was hired to lay 
out the potential legal ramifications of the breach. Fourth, 
a public relations (PR) firm was hired to start preparing 
the commercial ramifications of this breach. 
During the impact management phase ABC Industries 
changed the use of existing resources and processes. 
Product launch was accelerated by two months, creating a 
need for additional research personnel and overstretching 
the capacities of existing research personnel, decreasing 
productivity. Also, product shipments were suspended 
while an upgrade was developed for the products as a 
result of the stolen IP. Important contracts were lost 
probably as a result of both a decreased perception of 
product safety in the customers, and by the delayed 
shipment of existing orders. Contract losses were 
expected to account for 5 -10% of the projected revenues 
for the company. 
During the recovery phase, ABC industries made 
structural changes as a result of the cyber-attack. First, it 
performed an inventory of all its IP, instituted an IP 
protection program, and upgraded its security 
infrastructure. Fig.1  shows an evolution of these actions. 
 
Fig. 1.  Action timeline for ABC Industries disruption [6] 
 
As a result of the cyber-attack, ABC industries 
reported additional costs of US$ 3.2 billion over 5 years. 
Despite their sales level returning to normal levels after 
one year, the total recovery time was of five years. The 
following figure shows the evolution of the Sales and 
Profit levels with respect to the expected sales and profit 
levels, and is in essence the reference mode a dynamic 
model would seek to reproduce and explain. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Evolution of relative sales and profit levels during 
disruption 
 
 
B.  Model Development 
 
From the case description, a series of circular 
causality feedback loop “types” can be identified (See 
Fig.3).  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Generic feedback loop types present during a resilient 
response 
 
A first type corresponds to those feedback loops that 
form vicious circles with respect to the declining 
performance levels. An example of this is the loss of 
contracts derived from the IP theft: the more contracts or 
sales are lost, creates an even lower sales level increasing 
the sales gap and the profit gap.  
A second type of feedback loops, are the “flexibility 
options” that the company uses to manage resources in 
the short term. The case mentions mainly management 
and R&D personnel as the internal resources involved, 
and PR, cyber-security consultants and legal counsel as 
external resources. The type two feedback loops can be 
further subdivided into either 1) a redistribution of 
internal resources (as in the short term there has been 
limited time to increase these resources), or the hiring of 
external resources, available quickly, but at additional 
cost, such as the case of the public relations firm, the 
cyber-security company and the Law consultant. Both of 
these options have an effect on the performance, through 
a decrease in the IP generation productivity, and through 
the increase in operation costs, respectively. 
A third type of feedback loops are those that the 
company uses to manage the long-term actions, which we 
have denominated the recovery options. Examples of this 
include the hiring of additional R&D personnel that was 
hired for the generation of additional IP. These have 
effects on costs and are the last ones to be maintained 
until the company reaches the expected operation level. 
Figure 3 shows a causal loop diagram (CLD) representing 
these generic feedback loop types. 
The specific loops identified in the description are 
shown in Table 1.  
 
Table. 1.  Feedback loops identified in description 
 
 
These Feedback loops represent the circular causality 
structures present in the case description, connecting 
relevant variables as seen in Fig.4. 
In order to start building a dynamic model derived a 
first approach considers only the basic loops that create 
the base behavior, as shown in Fig. 5. The interaction of 
these loops tells a story of how a resilient behavior comes 
about without a disruption. 
R1, reinforcing loop 1, “IP Rules” feedback loop. 
This is the main mechanism through which a company 
based in exclusive IP develops its business. Exclusive IP 
generates a Demand which is translated into Actual Sales 
and Actual Profit levels, which are partially invested into 
the development of more Exclusive IP, expanding the 
business 
R1, reinforcing loop 1, “IP Rules” feedback loop. 
This is the main mechanism through which a company 
based in exclusive IP develops its business. Exclusive IP 
generates a Demand which is translated into Actual Sales 
and Actual Profit levels, which are partially invested into 
the development of more Exclusive IP, expanding the 
business 
B1, balancing loop 1, “Marketing stabilizer” feedback 
loop. This captures the main mechanism ABC Industries 
uses to counteract differences in demand. Since the 
development of IP is a long, uncertain process, which is 
then reflected as exclusive products to the market, the 
way in which demand fluctuations are counteracted are 
through changes in the sales strategy through the use of 
marketing instruments, creating a loop that does not let 
the Sales Gap to increase endlessly. 
 
Loop 
Number
Loop Type
Loop 
Number
Loop Name
1 Reinforcing R1 IP Rules
2 Reinforcing R2 PR to the rescue
1 Balancing B1 Marketing Stabilizer
2 Balancing B2 IP Expiration
3 Balancing B3 Marketing Costs
4 Balancing B4 Hacker Attacks
5 Balancing B5 Trust issues
6 Balancing B6 Productivoty Loss
7 Balancing B7 Security Costs
8 Balancing B8 Legal Bundle
9 Balancing B9 Legal cousel
10 Balancing B10 Legal costs
11 Balancing B11 PR Costs
12 Balancing B12 Leak containment
 
Fig. 4. Feedback Loops present in the case description 
 
 
Fig. 5. Basic Feedback Loops present in the case description 
 
 
B2, balancing loop 2, “IP expiration” feedback loop. 
This captures the process of IP expiration, resulting from 
the limited time for which an IP is exclusive to the 
company that created it. 
B3, balancing loop 3, “Marketing Costs” feedback 
loop. This captures additional marketing costs, which 
limits the amount of marketing possible as it affects the 
profit level with a direct consequence in the number of 
R&D projects that can be started. 
The resulting Dynamic model considering these base 
loops is shown in Fig. 6. The loops correspond to those in 
the CLD in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Stock-and-flow model for the basic model 
 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
 A dynamic model can be validated in a variety of 
ways, as it has been documented by Senge and Forrester 
[14]. 
In this case, the base model was tested from 
equilibrium for an initial disruption in the level of 
Exclusive IP stock, and different levels of some of its 
exogenous variables, i.e., marketing feedback, customer 
adjustment time and marketing contract times. The 
resulting Sales Gap for this sensitivity analysis is shown 
in the following graphs. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic Feedback Loops present in the case description 
 
Marketing contract time had extreme values of 1 and 
12 months, customer adjustment time had variations from 
3 to 12 months, and the Marketing Rate had a range of 0 
to 2000. 
The evolution over time of the sales gap resembles the 
behavior mode indicated during the case description in 
Fig. 2. Given the negative feedback loops present a slight 
over shoot is seen in all cases for one of the extreme 
values, and the sales gap recovers the desired level after 
close to 18 months 
Despite only considering the feedback loops in Fig.5 
from all the ones present in the case description, this basic 
model points the way forward for broadening and 
deepening the dynamic representation of the case study. 
The additional feedback loops should be introduced 
sequentially, testing how the model behavior is affected 
by each addition. 
This process also illustrates a possible path from Case 
study to Dynamic Model, summarized as the iterative 
process of extracting the mental models present in the 
data, and creating maps of circular causality that drive 
processes over time: identify the actions from the case, 
identify the perceived causality of those actions and the 
variables that are affected in the process. Then by 
differentiating those variables that are slow to change 
from those that change quickly, the stock and flow 
diagram can be attempted. 
The data gathering process for this paper revealed 
two interesting shortcomings with respect to the 
information available in a case study: 1) the descriptions 
imply causality without exploring it explicitly. It follows 
that the information contained in the way in which agents 
in the system assume the system works, is not gathered 2) 
There is an idealized process described as a unification of 
different data sources, obscuring a very important source 
of unexplained behavior in systems, this being the 
misalignment between mental models of agents acting in 
the same system. The contradictions should not be 
discarded, but rather compared and accounted for, as 
these might very probably have some influence in 
“unexplained” system behaviors. 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 By developing of a dynamic model based on a 
specific case study about the resilient response to a cyber-
attack, this paper has shown the process of such an 
approach for representing cross-disciplinary processes 
that occur when an organization has to manage 
disruptions. Additionally it has put forward an initial 
approach for understanding the structure in an 
organization behind a resilient behavior.  
Reaction design will involve the identification of 
these and other structures, obtaining adequate values for it 
governing exogenous variables; a crucial activity that will 
need to be internalized by organizations. 
The suitability of undertaking a medium to long-term 
timeframe analysis of the problems related to the effects 
of cyber risks in operations, as well as the limited 
information available about past events of resilient 
response to cyber-attacks, make SD an attractive tool 
since it is a methodology less concerned with reproducing 
past behavior, focusing rather on the structures underlying 
the observed behavior, through the identification and 
explicit representation of the mental and formal models 
present in the organization.  
The effect of considering a long-term view, beyond 
the immediate short term operational pressures, both 
allows for designing a response that minimizes the overall 
cost of a disruption, and identifies incentive structures 
that promote this response. 
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